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Abstract 
The constitutional politics of the European Union have been intensely debated in 
recent times. A key concern, voiced both within the academy and at street level, is how 
citizens could be endowed with the ability to shape, revise and legitimise evolving 
constitutional settlements. This paper begins by discussing recent accounts of 
‘constituent power’ in the EU that seek to offer guidance in this respect. It argues that 
these accounts are normatively insightful but ultimately stop short of providing a 
viable model of constitutional agency. The remainder of the paper then aims to 
examine what such a model could look like, looking for inspiration to the much-
neglected political practice of transnational partisanship. Specifically, the paper 
examines the transnationally coordinated constitution-making efforts of Christian 
Democratic partisans in the founding period of the EU, suggesting that there is much 
to learn from these efforts as far as EU constitutional politics is concerned. 
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Transnational Partisanship and Networked 
Constituent Power in the EU 
 
1. Introduction 
The constitutional politics of the European Union have been intensely debated 
in recent times. One widespread perception animating the debate is that the 
constitutionalisation of the EU polity has taken place in a largely apolitical 
fashion, in a process driven by decisions of courts, notably the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU), that are taken in isolation from political contestation and 
popular participation (e.g. Glencross 2014; Grimm 2015; Scharpf 2017). This has 
led to increased calls for the politicisation of the EU constitutional order (e.g. 
Fabbrini 2016; Glencross 2014; Niesen 2017). Accordingly, citizens should be 
endowed with the ability to shape, revise and legitimise evolving constitutional 
settlements. 
This view is not only voiced within the academy. Analogous concerns have also 
been expressed at the street level, perhaps most prominently in the pan-
European movement DiEM25. DiEM’s express ambition is to establish a 
European constituent assembly, in which the citizens of Europe should 
deliberate on how to transform the EU into a ‘full-fledged democracy’ 
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(DiEM25, 2017). The goal is to transform the citizens of Europe into a constituent 
power capable of revising the constitutional features of the EU at large. 
The normative logic underpinning these scholarly and activist perspectives is 
as old as modern democracy itself: if the EU is to be a democratic constitutional 
order, then its citizens must be the source of that order, and the subjects with 
whom sovereignty ultimately rests (Habermas 2011; Cohen 2012). But how 
exactly should we think of constituent power in the EU? It is one thing to stress 
the importance of enhanced constitutional agency, and quite another to 
provide a model of how constitutional agency can and should be exercised.  
As a response to this question, a small number of political and legal theorists 
have recently elaborated sophisticated accounts of constituent power in the EU 
that are intended to resolve these complex normative and conceptual issues 
(Cheneval 2011; Crum 2012; Habermas 2011; Niesen 2017; Patberg 2017; von 
Achenbach 2017). In this paper, I begin by outlining these accounts. I suggest 
that there are good reasons to favour accounts of ‘mixed’ constituent power, as 
defended by Jürgen Habermas (2011) and others, over ones that see constituent 
power as resting solely with the peoples of EU member states. However, I also 
show that existing accounts of that kind are inadequate, inasmuch as they 
under-theorise how real-world citizens can come to act as constituent power in 
the first place. 
The remainder of the paper then aims to explore how the abstract principles of 
pouvoir constituant mixte may be connected to political practice. I look for 
inspiration to a much-neglected political practice – transnational partisanship. 
Drawing on the case of Christian Democratic transnationalism, I specifically 
discuss how partisan networks honed by like-minded political activists and 
elected representatives from different European states have provided the 
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backbone for Christian Democrats’ successful exercise of supra-state 
constituent power. This distinctive mode of cross-border organisation and 
coordination helps imagine how today’s citizens can engage as agents of EU 
constitutional politics.  
Although the model of partisanship-driven ‘networked constituent power’ has 
many attractive features, and has been proven to be in principle feasible, it 
cannot be adopted without modifications. Three revisions are central, I suggest: 
contrary to the Christian Democratic reliance on elite-driven politics, 
contemporary transnational partisan networks aimed at exercising constituent 
power must be open to citizen participation; contrary to Christian Democratic 
practice in the post-war years, they must be ready to submit actions to public 
approval; and in contrast to the Christian Democratic insistence on religious 
establishment, they must develop a more inclusive justificatory rationale for 
their constitutional agenda. 
In sum, the paper argues that there is much to learn from Christian Democratic 
transnationalism when it comes to the exercise of constituent power in the EU 
– first because it offers a promising general model for organising and 
coordinating constitutional agency, and second because reflecting on its less 
attractive features permits us to see which mistakes are to be avoided in future 
efforts to politicise the EU constitutional order.  
2. Constituent Power in the EU 
A polity can be considered democratic if power vests ultimately in ‘the people.’ 
This is the essence of the modern doctrine of popular sovereignty that 
underpins most democratic constitutional orders. The people of a democratic 
polity is accordingly ascribed the status of constituent power – the agent to 
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whose will the original constitution can be traced and who retains the authority 
to decide all issues of constitutional design. This means that the people are 
endowed with two powers: the power to legitimately bring a democratic 
constitutional order into existence, and the power to reform its foundational 
norms and rule as they see fit (see Arato 2016; Böckenförde 2006; Kalyvas 2005; 
Loughlin 2014). 
On the face of it, it is difficult to make sense of this concept in the context of the 
European Union (Walker 2007). For the EU is not a democratic federal state 
with a central constitutional document that can in some relevant sense be seen 
as the product of ‘the people,’ but a supranational polity that has developed 
from a relatively loose association of nation states into a constitutional order 
comprising of multiple member states (on the nation state/member state 
distinction, see Bickerton 2012; on EU constitutionalisation, see Grimm 2015). 
Who might in this polity be the agent to whom the ultimate authority to decide 
constitutional issues can be attributed, and who is thus responsible for enacting 
constitutional reform and revision? 
Two different responses to that question have emerged in the recent political 
theory literature. The first assumes that the EU is ‘not constituted by a single 
people or “demos”’ (Crum 2012: 45) but that it has ‘several pouvoirs 
constituants,’ namely the demoi of the member states (Cheneval et al. 2015: 4; 
Cheneval 2011). Authors defending this sort of position follow broadly 
Rawlsian argumentative strategies, invoking such devices as an ‘original 
position’ and ‘public reason,’ and suggest that decisions about EU 
constitutional design ought to be determined by the member states’ peoples. 
As Cheneval et al. (2015: 4) write, ‘sovereign decisions’ such as treaty 
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ratifications ‘are to be taken by or [must be] directly accountable to the pouvoir 
constituant of the states which are the citizens organized as People.’ 
Different conclusions have been drawn concerning this account’s implications 
for the politicisation of the EU constitutional order. Some scholars take it to 
imply that the member states’ peoples must participate in a direct and 
unmediated fashion in EU constitutional politics (Cheneval 2011: 133-137). 
Other authors accept that constitutional decisions of this sort may be made by 
elected representatives, but affirm the positive role direct-democratic 
mechanisms can play in incentivising representatives to aim at constitutional 
decisions that all those subject to it can accept (Crum 2012). Either way, the 
subjects exercising constitutional agency always ought to be the member state’s 
demoi. 
One straightforward reason to find this strategy appealing is that locating 
constituent power in the demoi of EU member states seems to be descriptively 
accurate, inasmuch as member states are often said to remain the ‘masters of 
the treaties’ (Grimm 2016: 56-58); so from the point of view of realism, the first 
account has much going for it. Yet, as several commentators have pointed out, 
the focus on domestic pouvoirs constituants faces sizable obstacles. If constituent 
power refers here, as it typically does, to the more or less unrestrained 
competence to establish and revise constitutional orders, does this mean that 
member states’ constituent powers also operate in an unbound fashion when 
they engage constitutional politics at the EU level? And if that is the case, what 
happens when conflicts between multiple pouvoirs constituants arise?  
The first account of constituent power in the EU has no answers to these 
questions. Its assumption that the constituent power of the member states’ 
peoples simply extends beyond the state, as if ‘the involvement in EU 
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constitutional politics represented just another mode of intra-state 
constitutional revision’ (Patberg 2017: 206), indeed veils these problems. At 
work seems here the contestable Schmittian assumption that the allocation of 
constituent power is an either-or question, such that any exercise of constituent 
power beyond the state is bound to nullify the constituent power at the state 
level (cf. Cohen 2012: ch. 2). 
Aiming to overcome such a view, the second account of constituent power in 
the EU that has been proposed in the recent literature on the topic offers a 
possible way forward. The suggestion is to conceive constituent power in the 
EU as pouvoir constituant mixte, understood as a supra-state constituent power 
in which individuals participate in their dual capacity as members of the 
member states’ demoi, on the one hand, and Union citizens, on the other.  
One prominent author who has developed such a view is Jürgen Habermas 
(2011; 2017). In his more recent work on the topic, Habermas specifically 
imagines a complex European constituent assembly in which delegates, 
represented in their two ‘personae,’ deliberate over the constitutional features of 
the EU (Habermas 2017; cf. Habermas 2011: 68-70). The thought is that, in such 
an assembly, individuals are ‘able to address the other side with the aim of 
striking a balance between their respective interests’ (Habermas 2017: 174), and 
thus able to devise constitutional norms and rules that prevent potential 
conflicts between the member states’ pouvoirs constituants, whilst ensuring that 
individuals’ normative expectations vis-à-vis the EU are given adequate 
expression. 
Importantly, Habermas’ approach is not intended as a descriptive account of 
how supra-state constituent power can operate as a real social force. Instead, 
its purpose is to demonstrate to what extent certain elements of the current EU 
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constitutional order can be justified from an ‘idealised participants 
perspective,’ and which require revision (Habermas 2011: 69). Habermas’ 
strategy is to start from the presumption that the EU has already assumed a 
democratic character as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon, and then conduct a 
‘rational reconstruction’ of the practice of law-making and implementation in 
the post-Lisbon Treaty EU. Analogous to his more generalised reconstructive 
approach, as developed in Between Facts and Norms (1994), this entails asking 
what hypothetical delegates to a European constituent assembly would decide 
in an idealised rational dialogue about the EU’s constitutional foundations. 
No doubt, the notion of pouvoir constituant mixte presents a significant advance 
in theorising about constitutional agency in the EU. It can powerfully overcome 
the problems noted in connection with the first account of constituent power in 
the EU. Yet, if one seeks an action-guiding model of EU constitutional politics, 
Habermas’ account is the wrong place to look. For, since it conceives supra-
state constituent power in purely hypothetical terms, as a post hoc justificatory 
device for existing institutional arrangements, it effectively accepts that 
constitutional norms can plausibly be articulated in isolation from procedures 
of political contestation – without the participation of those to whom these 
norms are supposed to apply. 
On a strong reading, one might say that Habermas’ perspective provides not 
so much a solution to the problem that the constitutionalisation of the EU polity 
has taken place in a largely apolitical fashion, but a justification for the apolitical 
process of constitutionalisation that has so often been lamented. Although 
Habermas is generally sympathetic to a ‘more democratic’ EU, he stops short 
of offering prescriptions concerning the politicisation of the EU constitutional 
order. 
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That Habermas conceives EU constitutional politics in purely counter-factual 
terms also raises another problem. Even if his approach of ‘rational 
reconstruction’ could settle all questions to do with the constitution of the EU 
at a particular moment in time, constitutional norms must – at least to some 
extent – be adapted to an evolving historical context. In relegating citizens to 
passive recipients of norms, however, Habermas’ account leaves little room for 
bringing shifting preferences regarding their political communities and forms 
of collective organisation to bear on decisions concerning constitutional design.  
To better understand this worry, consider Habermas’ interpretation of the 
domestic dimension of the pouvoir constituant mixte. This is almost exclusively 
conservationist, in the sense that Habermas imputes to the citizens of member 
states’ demoi a strong and stable commitment to conserve the ‘revolutionary 
constitutional achievements of the past’ (e.g. Habermas 2011: 70; also see von 
Achenbach 2017: 196). Yet even if citizens are currently so inclined, they might 
at some point in the future wish to re-invent themselves as a political 
community, perhaps in a ‘co-evolution with their other persona’ (Niesen 2017: 
190). An account of constituent power that allows for such shifts cannot 
however remain tied exclusively to philosophical reflection; citizens must be 
made active participants to constitution-shaping, being able to translate re-
articulations of member state communities into constitutional arrangements. 
Moving beyond a purely counterfactual perspective, a number of scholars have 
asked how Habermas’ notion of pouvoir constituant mixte might inspire the 
exercise of constitutional agency in the real world.1 Niesen (2017: 190-191), for 
example, toys with the idea that the Habermasian approach might hold the 
                                               
1 On the usefulness and plausibility of such a move, see also Arato (2016: 70). 
Fabio Wolkenstein 
 9 
potential to empower ‘future subjects of constitutional reform,’ by providing 
them with a ‘new language in which to ground transformative European 
citizen engagement.’ Similarly, Patberg (2017: 210) interprets Habermas’ model 
as inviting reflection on how the pouvoir constituant mixte can be ‘brought into 
the world via a conscious decision taken by the demoi of the member states.’  
To be sure, up until this point this line of Habermasian scholarship has mainly 
produced a number of suggestive remarks about possible ways of connecting 
principles of constituent power to political practice (see esp. Patberg 2018); and 
for this reason, it is little able to offer a clear vision of how the practice of 
constituent power could look. Nonetheless, the shift of emphasis from the ideal 
to the phenomenological that is suggested by authors such as Niesen and 
Patberg is helpful for normative theorising on the politicisation of EU 
constitutional politics, as it alerts us to the importance of thinking hard about 
how normatively desirable forms of constituent power could look in reality. 
The most urgent questions to be explored in greater detail have to do with 
concrete and feasible organisational models for supra-state constituent power 
in the EU, the ideational resources that can support and sustain the collective 
pursuit of supra-state constitution-making, and the channels from which the 
sociological legitimacy of such efforts – roughly, the extent to which exercises 
of constituent power in the EU are considered legitimate by European citizens 
– can be expected to flow. The latter is of special relevance for a theory of 
constituent power that aspires to be democratic in the less philosophical sense 
of allowing space for contestation and dynamic change. Indeed, the fact that 
there is a ‘deep relationship’ (Arato 2016: 131) between sociological legitimacy 
and a democratic understanding of constitutional change and revision follows 
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directly from the earlier-elaborated commitment to transcending a purely 
counterfactual perspective on constituent power. 
My burden in the remainder of the paper is to address these questions and 
articulate an empirically informed model of how supra-state constituent power 
may be exercised in the EU. To that end, I will explore a hitherto neglected form 
of supra-state constituent power that rests on transnational partisan networks, 
through which like-minded individuals from different political spheres 
coordinate with the aim of shaping the constitutional order of Europe.  
3. Transnational partisanship and constituent power 
Reflecting on the prior section’s discussion, we may single out several 
desiderata that an account of constituent power in the EU must meet. 
1) It must be a ‘mixed’ form of constituent power whose participants act 
both in their capacity as members of states and as members of a 
supranational polity;  
2) it must allow for participation and contestation; and 
3) the institutional properties of constituent power must be specified, in 
particular 
a) a feasible model of organisation, 
b) ideational foundations that help justify and sustain the collective 
pursuit of supra-state constituent power, and 
c) sources of (sociological) legitimacy. 
These desiderata relate both to the normative-substantive and what may be 
called the ‘methodological’ aspects of theories of constituent power. The 
normative-substantive desiderata (1-2) derive in part from the suggestions put 
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forth by Habermas (concerning the superiority of mixed accounts of constituent 
power relative to unitary ones), and in part from the scholarship of Patberg and 
Niesen (and their emphasis on the importance of practices of participation and 
contestation). The methodological desiderata (3), on the other hand, demand 
approaching the subject matter from an angle that is quite different from that 
taken by all of these authors, paying particular attention to the practical 
questions of how a supra-state constituent power can be realised.  
The reason for this methodological shift is simple. If the debate around 
constituent power in the EU is to fully move beyond a counterfactual 
perspective, headway must be made on precisely those ‘applied’ questions that 
existing accounts only loosely touch upon or eschew altogether. In short, a 
model of pouvoir constituant mixte that is capable of guiding political practice 
has to spell out in more details how real-world citizens could act as shapers of 
the EU’s constitution. 
To develop such a model, I follow a strategy of theory-building that is 
historically-oriented and reconstructive. Taking as point of departure past 
practices of constitution-making and -shaping in the EU, I ask if and how these 
practices can provide a blueprint for constituent power that ‘future subjects of 
constitutional reform’ could follow. The particular set of practices I concentrate 
on – transnational partisan coordination that enables and supports the effective 
exercise of supra-state constituent power – has received little attention in the 
normative literature on the EU. Yet, as we shall see, tracing the contours of 
these unfamiliar forms of political agency can illuminate how a supra-state 
pouvoir constituant mixte might be organised. 
A paradigmatic case of the kind of transnational partisan coordination I am 
interested in, one with direct relevance to the EU, is the Christian Democratic 
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transnationalism that burgeoned in the interwar years and following World 
War II. Although parties of Christian Democratic orientation are not primarily 
known for their cross-border activities, their mode of cross-border organisation 
reflects a unique form of coordinating joint political action beyond the state.  
Central to their organisational strategy were transnational party networks: 
these provided arenas for deliberation over constitutional questions regarding 
the founding of a common European order, as well as sites in which joint 
political action was coordinated. Because of the dominance of Christian 
Democratic parties in the original member states of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), 
these networks turned out to play a crucial role in realising European Union, 
providing a powerful model for organising supra-state constituent power.2 
Let us look more closely at this form of political agency and explore whether it 
may satisfy the aforementioned desiderata. 
3.1 Organising constituent power: Partisan networks 
One of the defining features of the transnational partisan networks developed 
by Christian Democratic parties is that they were mainly structured around 
informal exchanges. Dialogue about shared commitments was a primary 
function of these exchanges: the purpose was to foster discussion between 
politically like-minded individuals from different national spheres. The topics 
addressed ranged from general reflections on the present state and possible 
                                               
2  The following is indebted to the excellent historical accounts of Christian Democratic 
transnationalism in Kaiser (2007) and Papini (1997), as well as the comprehensive edited 
volumes by Gehlen and Kaiser (2004) and Buchanan and Conway (1996). A further major 
resource used here for the purposes of reconstructing the distinctive features of Christian 
Democratic transnational organisation is the Volume 4 of the Documents on the History of 
European Integration Series B (1990), edited by Lipgens and Loth. 
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future of the jointly espoused political project, to more specific questions to do 
with connecting principles to practice (Gisch 1990; Kaiser 2007: esp. ch. 5). Here 
the more general nature of partisan practice makes itself visible: partisanship is 
not just about formulating political proposals, but also about implementing 
them (Rosenblum 2008; White and Ypi 2016).  
Insofar as transnational partisan coordination of this kind is about 
implementing political aims, it can be harnessed to realise objectives that single 
states cannot achieve on their own – for example by helping national parties 
synchronise their actions and activities in a way that allows them to execute 
larger tasks. From the point of view of EU constitutional politics, this is one of 
the most attractive features of this form of cross-border organisation, and the 
reason for why it can facilitate the exercise of supra-state constituent power. 
There are two different, sequential roles that the Christian Democratic partisan 
networks performed in this connection – roles we may consider in turn.  
The first is preparatory: transnational partisan networks can over time lay the 
groundwork for the future enactment of constituent power beyond the state, 
helping individuals to overcome difficult challenges associated with exercising 
power trans- or supranationally. Chief amongst these challenges is a lack of 
agreement among members of the network as to the goals to be pursued in 
concert. Likewise, the national parties that form the network may simply lack 
the means to directly translate their shared aims into decisions, for instance 
because they are not in government in their respective states. Transnational 
party networks can contribute to solving these problems, in that they provide 
platforms for cross-national dialogue aimed at devising common strategies to 
gain power in the future and/or developing a shared vision that all national 
parties uphold. 
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To see what this means in practice, consider one transnational party network 
that may straightforwardly be interpreted as having prepared later exercises of 
constituent power – the Secrétariat International des Partis Démocratiques 
d’Inspiration Chrétienne (SIPDIC). SIPDIC was a transnational organisation of 
Catholic parties that was founded in 1926 by the Italian left-wing Catholic Luigi 
Sturzo with the primary aim of fostering lasting peace between the peoples of 
Europe. The organisation disintegrated in 1939, in part because many 
democratically-minded Christian parties were put under severe pressure by 
fascist regimes, but also because the involved parties were unable to agree on 
a shared agenda of political objectives (Kaiser 2007: 116). Yet, although SIPDIC 
failed as a transnational organisation, the cross-border exchanges that occurred 
under its aegis proved crucially important for the Christian Democrat’s 
constitution-shaping activities after World War II. 
There are three senses in which this is true. Firstly, as historians of Christian 
Democracy (ibid.: 117) have pointed out, the transnational dialogue SIPDIC 
facilitated helped overcome a general reluctance among Christian Democratic 
parties to organise transnationally – a reluctance rooted in the view that the 
Catholic Church is the only legitimate international representation of Catholic 
interests and ideas. This was an important precondition for effective 
transnational organisation after the War. 
Secondly, the deliberations among SIPDIC’s members also promoted a 
collective learning process, showing ‘to all involved that party cooperation 
could only be effective if it combined strictly pro-democratic parties with a 
shared value system and was extended to democratic liberal and conservative 
Catholics to broaden its basis and strengthen its potential influence – and that 
it required some shared core strategic policy objectives’ (ibid.). Though this 
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learning process did not result in programmatic agreement in the interwar 
years, as I have noted, it prepared the post-war emergence of an ideological 
consensus among Christian Democrats concerning European unification (see 
below).  
Thirdly, though there was no direct organisational continuity between the 
networks formed around SIPDIC and the transnational associations that 
formed after World War II, key figures of post-war Christian Democracy – 
notably Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman – attended SIPDIC meetings 
and congresses and engaged in the association’s deliberations about the 
unification of Europe. It is not implausible to assume that their participation at 
these events shaped their views on achieving European unification, facilitating 
future agreement about collective goals – though it was only the mutual 
exchanges in the later-founded Nouvelles Équipes Internationales (NEI) that 
‘created the basis of personal confidence among … such politicians as 
Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer, which … made possible the policy 
associated with their names’ (Gisch 1990: 484). 
Importantly, as a practice of reasoning that involves individuals who are both 
members of nation states and potential members of a future supranational 
European order, the just-mentioned deliberations within SIPDIC may be 
interpreted as instantiating the sort of ‘two-personae’ exchanges envisaged in 
the Habermasian conception of pouvoir constituant mixte. In a sense, one may 
say that the success of SIPDIC was undermined by the fact that the interests 
tied to the first ‘persona’ – being a member of a particular nation state – were 
of greater significance to many of the participants than the interests associated 
with the (hypothetical) second persona. The French Popular Democrats, for 
one, mainly sought to use SIPDIC’s network to foster alliances against revisions 
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of the Versailles Treaty and, thus, also against the German Centre Party and 
Germany more generally. This created an atmosphere of mistrust among the 
parties and triggered numerous debates that were primarily about the assertion 
of national interests, rather than about goals shared by all network members. 
This was to change in the post-war era, where, as we shall see, Christian 
Democratic partisans were better able to bring their national commitments and 
trans- or supranational visions into equilibrium. 
I now turn to the second role transnational partisan networks can serve, which 
is even more relevant to the question of constituent power than the first. This 
may be called their executive role and refers to instances where members of 
partisan networks are capable of putting their shared goals into effect. At least 
two conditions must be met in order for this to be possible. The first is that 
members of the network agree on the aims and goals they wish to pursue in concert. 
Why this is crucial is not difficult to see: disagreement over possible courses of 
action often has action-impeding implications, sometimes even erodes mutual 
trust amongst those who associate with the purpose of acting together. The 
example of SIPDIC shows that transnational partisan networks are not immune 
to these problems. 
The second condition may likewise be inferred from the above discussion: this 
is that most or all of the parties forming the network are in a position that permits them 
to exert significant influence on general norms and laws, for example that they are 
in government in their respective states. Again, it is easy to see why this is 
important. If transnationally shared aims concerning the founding or 
constitutional revision of a supra-state order are to be realised, individual 
members of the partisan networks must also be capable to authoritatively 
shape (national) laws and constitutions. Holding office may further be seen as 
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warranting the (sociological) legitimacy of constituent agency: weighty 
ambitions of the kind typically involved in enactments of constituent power 
arguably require public support, and having gained sufficient electoral 
strength to be in government may plausibly be interpreted as signalling that 
such support is available. 
When these two conditions – agreeing on shared goals and having access to 
power – are satisfied, transnational partisan networks can provide a 
springboard for the co-operative implementation of shared projects across 
nation states. What does that involve exactly? One important thing 
transnational partisan coordination can ensure in this connection is that certain 
key decisions are taken more or less simultaneously in each state: for instance that 
all members of a future or present supranational community enact a major 
constitutional change at roughly the same time, or agree to the core 
constitutional features of a new, supra-state political order.  
The cross-border exchanges enabled by partisan networks may likewise 
facilitate coordinating strategic reactions to temporary political failures or crises, as 
well as to national and transnational dissent and resistance facing partisans. Reactive 
actions of this sort are instrumental to the realisation of trans- or supranational 
political projects, and they squarely fall in the category of executive action since 
they involve jointly taking authoritative steps aimed at keeping on track the 
implementation of a shared political project. 
The Christian Democrats’ transnational partisan networks were able to exercise 
this executive function mainly in the period after 1950, when Christian 
Democratic parties were the dominant political force in all six member states of 
the ECSC and EEC. Being connected to the relevant legislative and executive 
mechanisms in these states, the national parties were capable of realising 
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politically their shared supra-state project of building the constitutional 
foundation of ‘core Europe’ – and their transnational network was a major 
enabling factor in these exercises of constituent power. 
The first thing to note is that transnational party cooperation, notably via the 
consultations and congresses that took place in the newly-established NEI and 
the more informal Geneva Circle, promoted the homogenisation of policy 
objectives among Christian Democrats and more generally allowed them ‘to 
develop their own peculiar notion of “Europe”’ (Gehler and Kaiser 2001: 780).3 
The ideological consensus that emerged – most emphatically perhaps at the 
Sorrento congress in April 1950 – was not only a distinctively anti-communist 
but also, to some extent at least, an anti-liberal one: it not only opposed the 
areligious materialism of Stalin’s Russia, but also linked the horrors of the two 
World Wars to the ostensibly liberal roots of modern nationalism (Gisch 1990: 
480-484; Acanfora 2015). 4 At any rate, these shared ideological commitments 
also led Christian Democrats to converge on preferences concerning European 
integration – a convergence that, as one historian notes, was a ‘precondition for 
                                               
3 The necessity of agreeing on shared goals was widely recognised by Christian Democratic 
actors, as is evidenced in many recorded passages and communiqués. To cite just one example, 
the NEI’s official message of 1 January 1949, which it addressed to the European public, stresses 
at the outset that ‘One cannot establish a European union … without agreement on a common 
ideology’ (Message NEI 1949, ACDP Archives, NEI no. VI-004-002 or 004-059/3). 
4 The ‘political report’ of that congress, which was attended by leading statesmen from 15 
European countries, is insightful here. It starts by emphasising that ‘Christian Democratic 
movements have acquired a predominant position in postwar European political life. They 
have a double mission that no other political force is capable of fulfilling: (a) To improve the 
lot of workers … (b) To create a solid international community, or rather a supranational one. 
These two aims must, or rather can, be achieved only by democratic means.’ Later, it is stated 
that ‘The Christian Democratic movements are by their nature anti-totalitarian … we fight 
Communism because it bars the way to the creating of a Christian society’ and that ‘If by 
liberalism is meant the economic regime of complete laisser-aller, to that extent Christian 
Democracy is anti-liberal’ (NEI, Congrès de Sorrente, ACDP Archives, NEI no. VI-004-011/4). 
Fabio Wolkenstein 
 19 
developing common ideas for the constitutionalisation of core Europe and for 
preparing concrete European policy-making’ (Kaiser 2007: 240). 
The transnational deliberations that paved the way for this ideological 
convergence, insofar as they have been documented, may again be interpreted 
as reflecting the sort of ‘two personae’ logic that the exercise of mixed 
constituent power demands. A highly structured way of preparing 
transnational exchanges made this possible. For example, prior to the NEI’s 
1954 Bruges congress, which culminated in the passing of the ‘Manifesto of 
Bruges,’ which outlined the Christian-Democratic project of a European 
common market, the Belgian Christian Social politician Robert Houben, in his 
capacity as rapporteur for the Bruges congress, developed a detailed 
questionnaire on issues of European economic integration that he sent out to 
each national branch of the Équipes (Gehler and Kaiser 2001: 792). The answers 
national party representatives provided – qua citizens of European nation states 
– in turn served as the basis for deliberations at the congress, where participants 
also addressed each other qua members of a future European political order 
that transcends individual nation states. 
How did transnationally organised Christian Democrats eventually bring their 
shared vision of Europe to bear on constitutional decisions, enacting 
constituent power? It is important to note that the influence of transnational 
party networks remained mainly indirect: though they undoubtedly ‘saw it as 
their role to influence the process of integration in the direction of their own 
philosophy and programme’ (Gisch 1990: 481), Christian Democrats never 
intervened directly via the NEI or the Geneva Circle in the negotiation and 
implementation of economic treaty clauses. Neither in connection with the 
ECSC treaty, nor in connection with the EEC treaty, did transnational party 
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networks exercise power in an unmediated fashion (Kaiser 2007: 222). But this 
does not mean that their influence was negligible. The opposite is the case. For 
this was a period where, as we saw, national governments and ministries were 
largely controlled by Christian Democrats, and so the transnationally agreed 
political commitments made their way into the intergovernmental negotiations 
without the need for direct political interference of party networks. Not least 
because key Christian Democratic figures on the top of their respective party 
hierarchies (such as Konrad Adenauer) were at the forefront of transnational 
coordination, the transnationally agreed objectives could powerfully be 
channelled into intergovernmental decisions. It is not difficult to interpret this 
as exemplifying the political pragmatism that is a more general characteristic 
of Christian Democratic political strategies (cf. Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 
2010): there was simply no need to intervene in a process that was in any case 
largely controlled by partisans of Christian Democratic persuasion. 
With all that in mind, we may turn now to the question of whether the just-
discussed model of transnational organisation aimed at exercising supra-state 
constituent power satisfies the desiderata specified at the outset of this section. 
How does the transnational partisan account of constituent power fare in this 
respect? 
So far, it seems clear that it can satisfy desideratum (1), that which emphasises 
that the supra-state constituent power in Europe ought to be a ‘mixed’ form of 
constituent power, whose participants act both in their capacity as members of 
states and as members of a (present or future) supranational polity. The cross-
border communication enabled by transnational partisan networks can indeed 
induce dialogue between the two Habermasian ‘personae.’ There furthermore 
appears to be good reason to think that constituent power exercised via 
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transnational partisan networks is in principle a feasible organisational model 
(thus satisfying desideratum 3a). It may be considered feasible not only because 
it has been powerfully demonstrated to be workable provided that the requisite 
political will is available. Also, and perhaps more importantly, since it obtains 
its norm-creating power and legitimisation at the member state level it does not 
demand a complex supra-national institutional structure to operate effectively. 
This leads to a third point: in relying on electoral support in national political 
arenas, the model also specifies from which channels its sociological legitimacy 
can be expected to flow (thus satisfying desideratum 3c).  
3.2 Justifying and sustaining constituent power: The role of ideology 
Two of the above-stipulated desiderata have not been addressed yet. These are 
desideratum (2) – which demands that an action-guiding model of constituent 
power must allow for participation and contestation – and desideratum (3b) – 
which highlights that such a model will have to be underpinned by ideational 
foundations that help justify and sustain the collective pursuit of supra-state 
constituent power. I will take these in reverse order, speaking first to (3b). 
Before doing so, however, a more fundamental question needs handling. Why 
does it matter exactly that supra-state constituent power can rely on ideational 
foundations that support its justification and coordinated pursuit?  
As far as justification is concerned, one might say that, insofar as supra-state 
constituent power is not exercised directly by citizens but indirectly via elected 
representatives, as it is the case in the model the present paper concentrates on, 
it can claim to be exercised in a democratic fashion only if as its exercise can be 
justified to citizens (cf. Böckenförde 2006: 103). For justifications to be accepted, 
though, the reasons given for particular constitutional decisions – for example 
concerning the shape a future supranational order will take – must be rendered 
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meaningful and intelligible to citizens. Here it helps a great deal to be able to 
draw on ideational foundations – ideas, values, and rhetorical figures – that 
have resonance with a wider public because they form part of political 
ideologies that are deeply rooted in the relevant societies (cf. White and Ypi 
2016: ch. 3).5  
As far as support for the continual exercise of constituent power is concerned, 
a common ideational substrate is important because it can motivate those who 
aim at enacting constituent power (and others) to want the intended 
constitutional change to happen, encouraging them to put special efforts and 
energies into realising their ambitions over extended time. Theorists of parties 
sometimes speak in this connection of the ‘motivational benefits of 
partisanship,’ understood as the capacity of ideological commitments to help 
agents endure motivational and epistemic obstacles to the achievement of their 
political project (White and Ypi 2016: 85-96). Such resilience is indispensable 
when major acts of constitutional transformation are aimed at. 
A model of constituent power that centres on partisanship appears naturally 
well-suited to offer something in the way of ideational resources that facilitate 
the justification and sustained collective pursuit of constitutional founding or 
reform. For partisanship may be seen as a powerful underpinning not just to 
the sort of political commitment that reinforces the motivation of agents to act 
as constituent power, but also to the kind of justificatory activity necessary to 
endow the exercise of constituent power with democratic legitimacy 
(Rosenblum 2008; White and Ypi 2016). Ideology is not something to look to 
with scepticism when it comes to constituent power, in other words; rather, it 
                                               
5 Note that in justifying the exercise of constituent power, a contribution is also made to the 
sociological legitimacy of the undertaking, as specified by desideratum (3c). 
Fabio Wolkenstein 
 23 
should be regarded as providing socially rooted normative ideas that can be 
harnessed for the successful enactment of the latter (cf. Kalyvas 2006). 
A minimum requirement that must be met in order for an ideology to provide 
a suitable ideational underpinning for supra-state constituent power is that it 
can be reframed in transnational terms, as transcending particular geographical 
settings rather than reflecting the viewpoint of specific local constituencies 
(White and Ypi 2016: 202-203). 6  Moreover, when it comes to supra-state 
constituent power in the EU, presumably the simple fact that a political 
ideology can be presented in transnational terms is not sufficient for it to serve 
the aforementioned supporting roles; it must also be linked to diagnostic and 
prescriptive claims about Europe in particular, the geographical setting whose 
transformation is the ultimate intention. This involves clarifying vis-à-vis 
citizens how re-shaping the political constitution of Europe follows from 
specific transnational political commitments. Equally, it entails drawing, at 
least provisionally, lines of demarcation, delimiting where Europe begins and 
where it ends, and giving reasons for why the proposed boundaries are 
plausible. Without ‘localising’ transnational ideologies in this way, it is 
certainly difficult to imagine how the constitutional transformation of Europe 
could be justified to citizens. 
A glance at the Christian Democratic model of supra-state constituent power 
outlined here helps to better understand what it means to ‘transnationalise’ a 
                                               
6 Arguably this will not work for all ideologies, especially not those that define themselves 
against their neighbours. But as the history of transnational nationalism demonstrates, even 
political orientations that one would instinctively expect to resist ‘transnationalisation’ can be 
cast as aspiring to be a transnational community of commitments (Herren 2017; Zúquete 2015). 
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political ideology, to ‘localise’ that ideology in the context of Europe, as well as 
to employ it as a justificatory resource. 
Above I have already noted that an ideological consensus emerged among 
Christian Democrats in the post-war era, one that had not only anti-communist 
but also anti-liberal pretensions. This consensus was structured around views 
that go back to the advent of Christian Democracy as a political movement, 
most importantly the doctrine of ‘personalism,’ which sees the human being as 
constantly embedded in groups and natural communities that are not 
necessarily coextensive with the nation state (hence the opposition to the 
species of political liberalism that centres on powerful secular and centralised 
nation states), and the notion that Europe is a spiritual realm at the origin of 
which Christianity lies (hence the opposition to the materialist world view that 
characterises communism and, to some extent at least, also liberalism) 
(Forlenza 2017: 268-269; Kaiser 2007: 228-229). It is easy to see how these ideas 
could ground a transnational vision for a unified Europe that is, at the same 
time, still ‘local’ enough to appeal to shared historical understandings of what 
Europe is (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010: 196). 
In fact, much as the twin ideas of personalism and Europe as a distinctively 
Christian realm supported the project of establishing a unified Europe with 
shared trans- or supranational political institutions, they also opened the door 
to very narrow conceptions of where the boundaries of Europe lie. 7  In 
particular, the notion of Europe as a spiritual space that is, at bottom, a 
                                               
7 To get a flavour of the language used, consider the 1948 statement of the NEI’s Cultural 
Commission on ‘Europe as a Cultural Unit’: ‘The European spirit, which has always striven for 
unity and can never exist in a diaspora, has been and is the conscience of mankind. … [and] 
[t]he unifying life-force of Europe has always been Christianity’ (ACDP Archives, NEI no. VI-
004-101(4)). 
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Christian civilizational project often went hand in hand with idealisations of 
the pre-modern and pre-national Catholic West or Abendland. From this, it is 
only a short step to the kind of anti-Protestantism that conceives the boundaries 
of Europe as congruent with the Catholic countries of Western Europe, not to 
mention the tendency to assert the primacy of Catholicism over non-Christian 
religions (cf. Rosenboim 2017: 252-257). Even among the EU’s ‘founding 
fathers’ positions of this sort were not uncommon (Forlenza 2017: 272-273). 
Be that as it may – I shall return to these more problematic features of Christian 
Democratic ideology in the concluding section – what cannot be denied is that 
the Christian Democratic rationale for an integrated Europe was ultimately a 
powerful one, and one that resonated sufficiently with mass audiences to serve 
the purposes of political justification. It is of course true that Christian 
Democratic politicians, even if they held this view, rarely publicly presented 
their plans of an integrated Europe in terms of creating a democratic 
Carolingian Empire that restores the natural order of European history. 
Nonetheless, the idea of Europe ‘as an ideal and moral fatherland understood 
in no way as in opposition to, but rather as a natural development of, the 
traditional [national] fatherland’ was a recurring trope in the political rhetoric 
(and writing) of key Christian Democratic figures (Forlenza 2017: 276 and 279). 
This trope could be usefully employed to justify the integration of nation states 
into a larger supranational order that required delegating sovereignty to new 
European bodies, at a time when historicised religious or quasi-religious 
arguments still had traction with mass publics. 
The distinctive political ideas that undergird transnational Christian 
Democracy are complex, and so are the ways in which they have been put to 
use. The main point to note is that Christian Democratic ideology provided a 
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potent ideational foundation for the exercise of constituent power aimed at 
creating a united Europe after World War II; the fact that ‘the core ideological 
concepts of Christian democratic politics seemed ready-made for European 
integration’ (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010: 196) considerably facilitated 
the coordinated enactment and justification of the major constitutional changes 
the members of the transnational network of Christian Democrats intended. No 
doubt, then, desideratum (3b) is also satisfied by the Christian Democratic 
model of supra-state constituent power. 
3.3 Constituent power without participation? 
This leaves us with desideratum (2), which plays up the importance of popular 
participation and contestation. As discussed in the paper’s first section, a 
primary normative requirement that must be met by accounts of supra-state 
constituent power in the EU is that they include citizens more directly in the 
exercise of constituent power; citizens ought to be given the opportunity to 
participate actively in constitution-making activities and be able to contest past 
constitutional arrangements on their own terms. Can the proposed strategy of 
grounding constituent power in transnational partisanship deliver on this 
concern? 
One way of looking at the practice of transnational partisanship is to see it as 
almost inevitably elitist. Accordingly, it may well be that its component parts – 
national and local parties – are participative, but the transnationally pursued 
coordination will tend to remain driven by political elites who possess the 
requisite cross-border contacts (as well as the linguistic abilities to 
communicate with their counterparts from other countries). If true, this would 
signal reason for the utmost pessimism concerning the capacity of the 
transnational partisanship-facilitated model of supra-state constituent power 
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to satisfy desideratum (2). The unavoidably elite-centred nature of 
transnational partisanship precludes inclusive participation and contestation. 
The assumption that elitism is intrinsic to transnational partisanship certainly 
finds confirmation in the Christian Democratic transnationalism this paper 
engages with. While the history of Christian Democracy may plausibly be 
interpreted as characterised by a gradual, if sometimes reluctant, espousal of 
mass democracy (Kaiser 2007; cf. Müller 2011: 141-143), there is a very clear 
sense in which many of the key figures behind the constitutionalisation of core 
Europe ‘espoused a top-down culture of public administration in which 
decision making was largely remote from the people,’ and ‘believed in 
supranationalism as something done by well-connected elites of high-minded 
planners and bureaucrats’ (Forlenza 2017: 278-279). It is easy to see the secretive 
and elitist structure of the transnational associations we have encountered 
earlier – the NEI and the Geneva Circle – as giving institutional expression to 
this attitude. Citizens are thereby relegated to the status of passive recipients 
of constitutional choices, who, despite retaining the capacity to vote the parties 
who collaboratively exercise constituent power out of office, have close to zero 
influence on the decisions of elites. 
Should we infer from this that the Christian Democratic model of supra-state 
constituent power fails to satisfy desideratum (2), and hence that the model is 
inadequate as a blueprint for constituent power in the EU? A modest 
qualification of this view would highlight that, even if citizens were largely 
excluded from participation, the parties whose elites associated transnationally 
with the aim of shaping Europe’s constitutional order still enjoyed widespread 
electoral support domestically, in the six original member states of the ECSC 
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and EEC. The acquiescence of mass publics would at least seem to weaken the 
concern that a failure to satisfy desideratum (2) disallows the model as a whole. 
One might be tempted to go one step further and draw a normative conclusion 
from this observation: namely that desideratum (2) should generally be framed 
more loosely, being accommodated to circumstances where discretionary 
decision-making by political elites is widely considered legitimate by citizens. 
The intuition is that, while it cannot be denied that participation matters, it 
would be implausible to assert its ultimate importance in cases where 
constituent power is endowed with what I have called sociological legitimacy 
(3c). Is the way forward then to think of the satisfaction of desideratum (2) as 
in-principle desirable but not necessary? If so, we would have to say that there 
is nothing problematic about the elitist character of the Christian Democratic 
model of constituent power. 
But such a position would be spurious. It is possible to accept that broad 
popular participation in acts of constituent power can be less important in some 
moments than in others, while retaining the view that a model of constituent 
power that lacks participatory channels altogether is insufficient. A loosening 
of desideratum (2) cannot go so far as to lead one to affirm the primacy of elite-
driven over bottom-up and participatory constitution-making. This would be 
normatively objectionable if the arguments about constituent power that I have 
examined at the outset of the paper are sound, according too negligible a role 
to citizens in the shaping of the fundamental institutions of their political order. 
In this light, it would seem that there are still good reasons to think that the 
way in which Christian Democrats have organised supra-state constituent 
power leaves much to be desired. This despite the fact that their transnational 
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mode of coordination has many other attractive features possibly worth 
emulating. 
4. Revisions to the Christian Democratic model 
These initial reflections on the shortcomings of the Christian Democratic model 
of ‘networked’ constituent power instructively reveal that some revisions to the 
model are required if it is to be normatively defensible and capable of 
providing a point of orientation for supra-state constituent power in the EU 
today. While the model has many attractive features, and has been 
demonstrated to be in principle feasible, it cannot be adopted without 
modifications.  
In these final paragraphs, I want to suggest three necessary amendments. The 
first has already been evinced in the prior section: in contrast to the elitism of 
Christian Democrats, contemporary efforts to harness transnational partisan 
networks for the exercise of constituent power beyond the state ought to involve 
citizens in a participative fashion.   
The normative argument for conceiving constituent power in participative 
terms has already been rehearsed. The main concern, to repeat, is that 
constitutional acts cannot plausibly be said to be the product of a decision by 
‘the people’ if the latter are merely the recipients of decisions that are made 
without their involvement. Another question is the practical one of how 
transnational partisan networks could be designed in a sufficiently 
participatory and inclusive fashion. There are no doubt serious obstacles in the 
way. Chief amongst these is the challenge of scope: it is difficult enough for a 
small number of political elites to effectively coordinate across borders; these 
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difficulties are multiplied when larger numbers of citizens are involved, 
especially if most or all of them are supposed to have a say on decisions.  
How could these hurdles be overcome? What is certain is that some democratic 
division of labour is unavoidable. Even the most inclusive and participatory 
model of transnational partisan coordination we may be able to imagine cannot 
continually include all of its members in its decision procedures. Too 
geographically dispersed are the individuals involved to ensure that all of them 
have a seat at the table; too many potential voices will exist there to be convened 
in the same forum; and if ordinary citizens are to be implicated in the process, 
most probably their time constraints will also constrain their participation. Yet 
even if mechanisms of delegation or representation will necessarily be part of 
transnational partisanship, there are still diverse ways of including citizens. 
One would be to place the emphasis on national ‘nodes’ of the partisan network 
as sites of popular participation, and link these nodes together in a democratic 
fashion. The local chapters of the participant parties could accordingly provide 
venues in which citizens engage in deliberations about the larger constitutional 
project they seek to realise and select representatives who stand up for them in 
those transnational fora where decisions are taken (Wolkenstein 2016: 316). The 
organisational model adopted by the emerging transnational party DiEM25 
may be interpreted along these lines: its aim is to connect the views and ideas 
of local activists and supporters to the transnational level via democratic 
representatives, relying both on participatory forms of party membership and 
intra-party accountability. Whether this model is sustainable in practice 
remains to be seen, of course. But on its face, it seems capable of overcoming 
the challenge of scope I have highlighted. 
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The second modification I propose is relevantly related to the first but cannot 
be assimilated to it. This is that, contrary to Christian Democratic practice, 
future transnational partisan projects that seek to shape the EU’s constitution 
must be ready to submit actions to public approval.  
As we have seen earlier, many Christian Democratic partisans who were 
engaged in the transnational project of constitutionalising core Europe tended 
to be sceptical of mass politics. If one consequence of this was that their 
transnational groups remained highly exclusive (think of the Geneva Circles), 
another was that they refused to submit their constitutional decisions to public 
approval. Relying on the acquiescence of mass publics, they rather proceeded 
in a mode described by one commentator as ‘emergency regime, with regular 
steps of constitutional significance taken by executive decision, legitimacy 
sought in securitising narratives, and dissent discredited as resurgent 
nationalism’ (White 2016: 312). Political justification was intermittently offered, 
but popular authorisation was rarely directly sought.   
Transnationally enacted constituent power, it seems, will have to be careful not 
to regress to a form of ‘emergency politics’ if it is to be democratically 
defensible. While it is true that moments of constitutional change are 
exceptional moments where politics departs, to some extent at least, from the 
constraints of existing political and legal frameworks, agents of exceptional 
action can only plausibly claim that their decisions were democratic when they 
obtained approval from a wider public. One straightforward way in which this 
may be achieved is by inviting the participation of citizens, as illustrated a few 
paragraphs earlier. But there are also other ways in which public approval 
might be secured. 
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Calling elections in the immediate aftermath of constitutional change is one 
possibility, but it is arguably strategically unwise if the aim is to realise an 
ambitious project of constitutional change. After all, since the capacity of 
transnational partisan networks to put their constitutional-political aims into 
effect depends on the electoral support their component parties have achieved 
nationally, early elections at potentially polarised junctures jeopardise the long-
term feasibility of the constitutional project as a whole. An equally risky 
alternative is the referendum, which likewise may destabilise partisan 
networks and eventually impair their ability to act as agents of constitutional 
change. Yet it is also possible to imagine institutional devices that are less prone 
to induce uncertainty, and perhaps even better suited for constitutional politics. 
The kind of constitutional ‘crowdsourcing’ that has been tried out in Iceland 
would seem to provide a model that avoids the just-discussed pitfalls of more 
‘plebiscitary’ forms of seeking public approval (Landemore 2015). 
Finally, the third necessary revision to the Christian Democratic model has to 
do with the ideational foundations of Christian Democracy. If the distinctively 
Catholic (and, as we saw, anti-liberal and anti-communist) vision for an 
integrated Europe proved powerful and persuasive in the immediate post-war 
years, today and in the future a genuinely European political project must offer 
a more inclusive justificatory rationale for constitutional change. 
An initial worry concerning this suggestion is that it smuggles substantive 
normative commitments into the theory of constituent power and thereby pre-
empts the judgments of citizens as to what sort of constitution they prefer and 
what reasons they provide in support of it – a criticism analogous to that which 
I have levelled at accounts of constituent power that leave no space for citizen 
participation. But this is not my intention. My point is not that the Christian 
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Democratic idea of Europe as discussed above is objectionable from the point 
of view of justice – though the case for this view could easily be made – but that 
it is arguably out of sync with the realities of contemporary Europe and hence 
impotent as an ideational underpinning for constituent power. The concern is 
pragmatic, not moral, in substance: widespread mobilisation and effective 
justification will be difficult to achieve with a specifically Catholic story of 
Europe unity. 
That this might be the case has certainly been sensed by many Christian 
Democratic parties in the last two decades or so. As two observers note, many 
have ‘completely erased any reference, even perfunctory, to religion’ in their 
political agendas (Kalyvas and van Kersbergen 2010: 203), which has also 
informed their defence of an integrated Europe. Key Christian Democratic 
politicians today rarely invoke ideas of a spiritual ‘community of fate’ when 
they speak of the EU; the dominant diction is rather one that asserts the lack of 
alternatives to EU integration (White 2016; Seville 2017). The task for future 
transnational partisan projects aimed at constitutional change is to develop an 
ideational substrate that is capable of challenging this understanding of Europe 
without relapsing into an analogous emergency rhetoric or an excessively 
narrow conception of Europe’s boundaries. Current attempts to present 
constitutional change as the only means to secure the EU’s survival – the 
strategy of DiEM25 (Redder 2017) – would seem to fall short of these 
requirements. Even if effective on a short timescale, such moves risk excluding 
those who are uncertain as to whether survival is a goal worth pursuing in the 
first place, and may justify circumventing public approval when critical 
decisions are made. To be sustainable, transnational partisan projects must 
employ a broader, and more long-term vision of Europe. 
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5. Conclusion 
Recent times have seen a spirited debate on constitutional politics in the EU, 
with many scholars and activists problematizing that the constitutional order 
of Europe is insufficiently politicised. The guiding thought is that the EU can 
only claim to be genuinely democratic if its citizens can be considered the 
source of its constitution, and the subjects with whom sovereignty ultimately 
rests – which implies that constitutionalisation must not be driven solely by 
courts or political elites that act in isolation from practices of political 
contestation. The forward-looking task, then, is to reflect on ways in which EU 
citizens could be transformed into a constituent power, ideally one that 
operates above the level individual member states.  
The present paper has outlined a particular institutional model for supra-state 
constituent power that highlights how the normative principles of ‘mixed’ 
constituent power could be linked to political practice. It looked for inspiration 
to the transnational networks of Christian Democratic partisans that played a 
central role in the emergence of the European Community in the post-war era, 
examining the distinctive features of this model of supra-state constituent 
power. If the Christian Democratic model has several shortcomings that require 
modification, it also exhibits numerous attractive features future agents of EU 
constitutional reform could usefully draw on. It is not a one-size-fits-all foil that 
can directly be translated into political organisation; nor does it provide an 
undemanding way of organising constitutional agency, requiring as it does that 
political power can effectively be wielded by the parties to the transnational 
network. But it does signal that they are in-principle feasible modes of 
organising constituent power beyond the state that can be democratically 
legitimate. And if DiEM25’s current efforts to create a transnational party are 
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any indication, it seems plausible to conclude that transnational partisanship is 
not an idea of the past, either. 
To some readers, the suggested model of EU constitutional politics might seem 
excessively demanding. For not only requires it of those who seek to 
democratically re-invent the EU to organise transnationally, it requires them to 
mobilise and win elections in multiple, possibly even a majority, of EU 
countries. Arguably this sets the bar very high, and makes bottom-up 
constitutional change driven by transnational partisanship look like an unlikely 
prospect. But it is open to question whether constitutional reform initiated 
through transnational partisan coordination must take the exact same shape 
today that it did in the founding years of what eventually became the EU, that 
is, having parties of the same stripe form government in all member countries. 
It is at least imaginable that, once a critical mass of citizens supports the idea of 
constitutional change, governing parties that were not initially in favour of that 
idea become willing to cooperate in transnational constitutional politics. And 
of course, one might also reasonably ask whether there is anything wrong with 
models of constitutional change being demanding. That constitutional change 
should be easy is not a notion commonly entertained at the level of nation-
states, and there is little reason to think that we should revise that intuition 
when it comes to exercises of supra-state constituent power.  
Transnational Partisanship 
 36 
References 
Acanfora, P. (2015) ‘Christian Democratic Internationalism: The Nouvelles Equipes 
Internationales and the Geneva Circles between European Unification and 
Religious Identity, 1947-1954.’ Contemporary European History 24(3), pp. 375-
391.  
Arato, A. (2016) Post-Sovereign Constitution Making: Learning and Legitimacy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bickerton, C. (2012) European Integration: From Nation States to Member States. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Böckenförde, E. (2006) ‘Die verfassungsgebende Gewalt des Volkes – Ein Grenzbegriff 
des Verfassungsrechts.’ In E. Böckenförde and D. Gosewinkel (eds.) Wissenschaft, 
Politik, Verfassungsgericht: Aufsätze von Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 97-119. 
Buchanan, T. and M. Conway (1996) (eds.) Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1965. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Cheneval, F. (2011) The Government of the Peoples: On the Idea and Principles of 
Multilateral Democracy. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cheneval, F., S. Lavenex and F. Schimmelfennig. (2015) ‘Demoi-cracy in the European 
Union: Principles, Institutions, Policies.’ Journal of European Public Policy 22 (1), 
pp. 1-18. 
Cohen, J.L. (2012) Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, 
and Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Crum, B. (2012) Learning from the EU Constitutional Treaty: Democratic 
Constitutionalization beyond the Nation-State. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Fabbrini, S. (2016) ‘The Constitutional Conundrum of the European Union.’ Journal of 
European Public Policy 23 (1), pp. 84-100. 
Forlenza, R. (2017) ‘The Politics of the Abendland: Christian Democracy and the Idea of 
Europe after the Second World War.’ Contemporary European History 26 (2), pp. 
261-286. 
Gehler, M. and W. Kaiser (2004) (eds.) Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945. 
London: Routledge. 
Gehler, M. and W. Kaiser (2001) ‘Transnationalism and Early European Integration: 
The Nouvelles Equipes Internationales and the Geneva Circle 1947-1957.’ The 
Historical Journal 44 (3), pp. 773-798. 
Fabio Wolkenstein 
 37 
Gisch, H. (1990) ‘The “Nouvelles Équipes Internationales” (NEI) of the Christian 
Democrats.’ In W. Lipgens, and W. Loth (eds.) Documents on the History of European 
Integration, Volume 4: Transnational Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure 
Groups in the Struggle for European Union, 1945-1950. Florence: European 
University Institute, pp. 477-484. 
Glencross, A. (2014) ‘The Absence of Political Constitutionalism in the EU: Three 
Models for Enhancing Constitutional Agency.’ Journal of European Public Policy 
21 (8), pp. 1163-1180. 
Grimm, D. (2015) ‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case.’ 
European Law Journal 21 (4), pp. 460-473. 
Grimm, D. (2016) Europa ja – aber welches? München: C.H. Beck. 
Habermas, J. (1994) Faktizität und Geltung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Habermas, J. (2011) Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp.  
Habermas, J. (2017) ‘Citizen and State Equality in a Supranational Political 
Community: Degressive Proportionality and the Pouvoir Constituant Mixte.’ 
Journal of Common Market Studies 55 (2), pp. 171-182.  
Herren, M. (2017) ‘Fascist Internationalism.’ In G. Sluga and P. Clavin (eds.) 
Internationalisms: A Twentieth-Century History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 191-212. 
Kaiser, W. (2007) Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kalyvas, A. (2005) ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power.’ 
Constellations 12 (2), pp. 223-244. 
Kalyvas, S. N. and K. van Kersbergen (2010) ‘Christian Democracy.’ Annual Review 
of Political Science 13, pp. 183-209. 
Landemore, H. (2015) ‘Inclusive Constitution-Making: The Icelandic Experiment.’ 
Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (2), pp. 166-191. 
Lipgens, W. and W. Loth (1990) (eds.) Documents on the History of European Integration, 
Volume 4: Transnational Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the 
Struggle for European Union, 1945-1950. Florence: European University Institute. 
Loughlin, M. (2014) ‘The Concept of Constituent Power.’ European Journal of Political 
Theory 13 (2), pp. 218-237. 
Transnational Partisanship 
 38 
Müller, J. (2011) Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Niesen, P. (2017) ‘The ‘Mixed’ Constituent Legitimacy of the European Federation.’ 
Journal of Common Market Studies 55 (2), pp. 183-192. 
Papini, R. (1997) The Christian Democrat International. Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
Patberg, M. (2017) ‘The Levelling Up of Constituent Power in the European Union.’ 
Journal of Common Market Studies 55 (2), pp. 203-212. 
Redder, A. (2017) ’Jeg ser ingen nationale løsninger.’ Atlas, available at 
http://atlasmag.dk/samfund/jeg-ser-ingen-nationale-løsninger, accessed 12 March 
2018. 
Rosenblum, N. (2008) On the Side of the Angels: An appreciation of parties and 
partisanship. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Rosenboim, O. (2017) The Emergence of Globalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Scharpf, F. (2017) ‘De-constitutionalisation and majority rule: A democratic vision for 
Europe.’ European Law Journal 23 (5), pp. 315-334. 
Seville, A. (2017) There is No Alternative”: Politik zwischen Demokratie und 
Sachzwang. Frankfurt am Main: Campus. 
von Achenbach, J. (2017) ‘The European Parliament as a Forum of National Interest? 
A Transnationalist Critique of Jürgen Habermas’ Reconstruction of Degressive 
Proportionality.’ Journal of Common Market Studies 55 (2), pp. 193-202. 
Walker, N. (2007) ‘Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of the European 
Union.’ In M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds.) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: 
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
247-268. 
White, J. (2015) ‘Emergency Europe.’ Political Studies 63(2), pp. 300-318. 
White, J. and L. Ypi (2016) The Meaning of Partisanship. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Wolkenstein, F. (2016) ‘A Deliberative Model of Intra-Party Democracy.’ Journal of 
Political Philosophy 24 (3), pp. 297-320. 
Zúquete, J. P. (2015), ‘The new frontlines of right-wing nationalism.’ Journal of Political 
Ideologies 20 (1), pp. 69-85.		
  
Recent LEQS papers 
Macchiarelli, Corrado 'What is the EU-UK relation all about? Tracking the path from monetary integration 
to “ever closeness”' LEQS Paper No. 137, September 2018 
Meyer, Niclas 'EU break-up? Mapping plausible pathways into alternative futures' LEQS Paper No. 136, 
August 2018 
Di Cataldo, Marco & Monastiriotis, Vassilis 'An assessment of EU Cohesion Policy in the UK regions: direct 
effects and the dividend of targeting' LEQS Paper No. 135, June 2018 
Innes, Abby 'First-best-world economic theory and the second-best-world of public sector outsourcing: 
the reinvention of the Soviet Kombinat by other means' LEQS Paper No. 134, May 2018 
Bojar, Abel 'With a Little Help from My Friends: Ministerial Alignment and Public Spending Composition 
in Parliamentary Democracies' LEQS Paper No. 133, April 2018 
Voss, Dustin “The Political Economy of European Populism: Labour Market Dualisation and Protest Voting 
in Germany and Spain” LEQS Paper No. 132, March 2018 
Campos, Nauro F. & Macchiarelli, Corrado “Symmetry and Convergence in Monetary Unions” LEQS Paper 
No. 131, March 2018 
Costa Font, Joan & Perdikis, Laurie 'Varieties of Health Care Devolution: "Systems or Federacies"?' LEQS 
Paper No. 130, February 2018 
Calrsson, Ulrika “The Perennial Thirty Years’ War” LEQS Paper No. 129, February 2018 
Isiksel, Turkuler “Square peg, round hole: Why the EU can’t fix identity politics” LEQS Paper No. 128, 
January 2018 
Hancké, Robert & Vlandas, Tim “The Politics of Disinflation” LEQS Paper No. 127, December 2017 
White, Jonathan “Between Rules and Discretion: Thoughts on Ordo-liberalism” LEQS Paper No. 126, 
November 2017 
Costa Font, Joan & Zigante, Valentina “Building ‘Implicit Partnerships’? Financial Long Term Care 
Entitlements in Europe” LEQS Paper No. 125, October 2017 
Bohle, Dorothee “Mortgaging Europe's periphery” LEQS Paper No. 124, September 2017 
Iordanoglou, Chrysafis & Matsaganis, Manos “Why Grexit cannot save Greece (but staying in the Euro 
area might)” LEQS Paper No. 123, August 2017 
Saka, Orkun “'Domestic banks as lightning rods? Home bias during the Eurozone crisis” LEQS Paper No. 
122, February 2017 
Coulter, Steve “Signalling Moderation: UK Trade Unions, ‘New Labour’ and the Single Currency” LEQS 
Paper No. 121, December 2016 
Di Cataldo, Marco “Gaining and losing EU Objective 1 funds: Regional development in Britain and the 
prospect of Brexit” LEQS Paper No. 120, November 2016 
Transnational Partisanship 
 2 
	
	
	
	
 
 
 
LEQS 
European Institute 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
WC2A 2AE London 
Email: euroinst.LEQS@lse.ac.uk  
 
 
 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/european-institute/research/leqs-discussion-paper-series 
 
 
